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Abstract. The emergence of IT-based trading activities like algorithmic trading 
or high-frequency trading alters the traditional trading environment within fi-
nancial markets. Thus, the question arises whether this technological arms race 
positively affects market quality or represents a risk related to market integrity. 
Within this study, we evaluate the order-to-trade-ratio for measuring overall IT-
based trading activity. Furthermore, in a longitudinal study, we assess the im-
pact of the order-to-trade-ratio on market quality. We find strong indications 
that price uncertainty has decreased with an increased order-to-trade-ratio and 
therefore has a positive impact on financial markets. However, the mere up-
grade of the trading systems does not relate into increased market liquidity.  
Keywords: Algorithmic Trading, High-Frequency Trading, Securities Trading, 
Order-To-Trade-Ratio, Value of IT 
1 Introduction 
Measuring the corporate and societal impact of information technology (IT) repre-
sents a research topic being highly relevant for several years [1-3]. Whereas many 
studies argue in favor and against a beneficial impact of IT, related studies are faced 
with problems concerning the measurement of its impact, the accountability of IT 
benefits to different areas as well as time lags between IT investments and the result-
ing effects [4].  
In this context, the question of examining the value of IT in general is closely re-
lated to the question of measuring the impact of IT on financial markets since this 
field of interest offers the possibility to overcome the classical problem of measuring 
IT performance: As typical studies use performance measures based on financial dis-
closures published in intervals of several months [5], [6], the impact of an increased 
number of financial market participants using IT in form of algorithmic or high-
frequency trading solutions can be measured without time lags by assessing market 
quality parameters such as volatility and liquidity. Thereby, market participants fol-
lowing highly sophisticated IT-based trading strategies submit and alter orders within 
very short periods of time, whereas the holding periods of financial instruments de-
crease [7]. Currently, there is an ongoing discussion whether market participants us-
ing these strategies represent a risk for market integrity and exchange infrastructures. 
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Furthermore, this has lead to the question of how these activities can be measured, 
how they contribute to market quality and whether these activities have to be limited. 
With this respect, several exchanges aim at limiting IT-based trading strategies and 
introduce fees for high order-to-trade-ratios (OTR), whereas OTR basically relates the 
number of order submissions to the number of order executions. Thus, market partici-
pants following intensive IT-based trading strategies that are connected with an in-
creased number of order submissions and modifications have to pay a compensation 
for their trading behavior.  
Different studies already investigated the impact of IT on financial markets, repre-
sented by algorithmic trading and low-latency trading activities [8-10]. However, 
these studies are confronted with a major problem: either they rely on proxies for 
these activities and are thus faced with the question whether the applied proxies are 
appropriate – or these studies rely on datasets that are directly acquired from ex-
change providers (including a flag for non-human activity) but cover only short peri-
ods of time.  
Within this study, we want to overcome these issues by combining both approach-
es: we measure the impact of IT on financial markets by means of OTR, which has 
also been proposed by different exchanges [11], [12] and is supposed to comprise the 
key characteristics of many IT-based trading activities. In order to evaluate whether 
OTR covers IT activity appropriately, we first relate OTR to algorithmic and high-
frequency trading activity based on a unique dataset classified by an exchange. We 
then investigate the relation of OTR and the key financial market quality indicators 
volatility and liquidity related to the constituents of the German blue chip index DAX 
for the time period from January 2008 to August 2011 in order to discuss whether IT 
has a positive impact on financial markets.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 focuses on related 
work discussing the IT impact in general as well as the effects of IT on financial mar-
kets. Within section 3, we address the problem of measuring the IT activity, whereas 
section 4 presents the results of our empirical study. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
2 Related Literature 
2.1 Impact of Information Technology on Firm and Sector Productivity 
In general, the impact of IT investments and the following IT usage has been investi-
gated by a variety of studies, e.g. [6], [13], [14]. Basically, these studies relate a 
measure for IT (e.g. the yearly IT budget per employee) to a firm’s performance 
measure (e.g. the net income per employee or productivity) [5], [6]. Consequently, the 
impact of IT has been focused on by different studies, whereas IT has been found to 
have a positive impact on revenue growth of single firms [6], employee productivity 
levels [5] and to cause a positive spillover effect within connected industries [13]. 
Furthermore, the importance of supporting factors like complementary organizational 
resources and the alignment of IT and business strategy have been highlighted [14- 
16]. However, there are also studies questioning the positive effect of IT on a global 
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level. For instance, it has been reported that next to increasing IT investments, overall 
productivity growth has stagnated [17]. 
In this context, there are several reasons that can be taken into account in order to 
explain why an increased IT usage may not lead to an increase in productivity. At 
first, potential advantages of one market participant caused due to IT investments may 
be canceled out by the same investments conducted by competing market participants 
[18]. Furthermore, reduced benefits from IT are also attributed to management failure 
in realizing the potential output and synergies [19].  
Apart from these reasons, different methodological aspects can lead to a reduced 
impact of IT on productivity [4]: One major issue within this context is represented by 
measurement errors, whereas inputs and outputs are not measured correctly and the IT 
impact cannot be determined precisely. For instance, different accounting principles 
hamper the comparability of different firms’ financials. Furthermore, the payoffs of 
IT investments may require some time to be realized, which is not taken into account 
in related studies. Finally, the positive effects of IT might also be redistributed within 
firms or misallocated by managers so that they cannot be identified correctly [4]. 
To overcome these measurement problems and to provide an analysis related to the 
impact of increased IT application on a global level, we focus on the effects caused by 
augmented overall usage of computerized trading systems within securities markets. 
Thereby, market participants apply a variety of IT systems and services, like different 
algorithms, high-frequency trading solutions or co-location and proximity services 
that enable them to automatically submit and alter orders within short periods of time. 
This characteristic has shaped today’s trading dynamics significantly as the share of 
these technologies is still rising. Taking securities’ markets into account has the ad-
vantage that the market impact of increased technology usage can be measured by 
observing well-established market quality indicators, i.e. liquidity and volatility. As 
follows, no further performance indicators have to be constructed. Furthermore, the 
impact of IT usage can be measured without lags: if market participants upgrade their 
infrastructure and are able to react faster on emerging situations, this can be measured 
promptly by an altered order submission behavior. Finally, by combining the benefits 
of a long-term analysis and a validation by means of a short term dataset which is 
classified according to the market participants’ IT usage, we are able to empirically 
analyze the co-movement between IT usage and market quality.  
2.2 Information Technology Impact on Securities Market Quality 
The emergence of IT within the securities trading value chain enabling automation 
and low-latency trading has significantly influenced trading behavior and dynamics 
[20]. IT order management and routing systems have offered a competitive advantage 
to its users and made buy and sell side firms alter their business models to provide 
connectivity and IT services. But as the majority of market participants are relying on 
these systems today, the question arises how and to what extent market quality and 
efficiency has changed through this increase in speed and automation. Alongside the 
academic studies analyzing certain aspects of securities trading innovations on market 
efficiency, academics have to overcome a variety of limitations.  
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Measuring the amount of information technology at financial markets is an ongo-
ing challenge. This is mainly driven by the unavailability of public accessible data 
allowing distinguishing between human and non-human (automated) traders. As a 
consequence, research in this field heavily relies on (1) direct observable algorithmic 
or high-frequency activity reported in proprietary datasets which are provided by 
exchanges; (2) indirect observable activity based on proxies measured by the analysis 
of public accessible data. Research with (1) is more accurate but requires an exchange 
operator willing to provide access to this data, additionally almost every study is lim-
ited to a couple of days or weeks through the immense data volume, which bears the 
risk of biased and time-depended results. (2) is grounded on public data and therefore 
such a bias can be overcome since studies could cover several years but the results 
rely heavily on the quality of the proxy or event used to identify a change in IT activi-
ty.  
For example, [8] received tick data of a temporary fee program introduced by 
Deutsche Boerse in December 2007, whereby institutions applying automated trading 
strategies taking part in the program received trading fees rebates. The authors argue 
that these traders contribute more to the efficient price by placing more efficient 
quotes. However, the data analyzed covers a total of 13 trading days. [9] assess the 
introduction of the New York Stock Exchange automated quote dissemination in 
2003. The authors provide one of the first event studies dealing with the impact of 
automated traders on market quality. In this case, the market provider introduced an 
automated quoting update which enabled faster information transmission for algo-
rithm-based traders that enables an exogenous increase in algorithmic trading and, on 
the other side, has nearly no advantage for traditional human traders. The authors 
therefore argue that any change in market quality after this event should be contribut-
ed to these automated traders. By analyzing trading characteristics before and after 
this event, the authors find that algorithmic trading lowers the costs of trading and 
increases the amount of price information each quote carries. These results are con-
firmed by [10]: Based on a dataset containing trades being initiated and flagged by 
algorithms, the authors argue that computers provide liquidity during periods of mar-
ket stress. Overall these results illustrate that computer-supported traders closely mon-
itor the market in terms of liquidity and information and react quickly to changes in 
market conditions, thus providing liquidity in tight market situations.  
The connection between an increased use of highly automated or low-latency trad-
ing systems and higher price variability is highly controversial among academics and 
politicians. Many studies thereby rely on proprietary data panels, like [21], [22]. Both 
conclude that it is highly unlikely that these technologies boost price uncertainty. 
Instead, prices could be considered more stable in times of high algorithmic and low-
latency activity. In a simulated approach, [23] creates different market situations with 
and without the participation of automated traders. [23] identifies decreasing price 
variability when computers act in the market. Due to reduced trading latency, more 
orders can be submitted to the market and therefore, the size of each order decreases. 
Because of smaller order sizes, fewer partial executions occur as the volume in the 
order book is more often sufficient to completely execute the small order. If less par-
tial executions occur, price movements narrow as an order executes at fewer limits in 
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the order book. On the other side, [24] indicates that high speed aggressive trading 
has increased stock price volatility within the years 1995 to 2009 after attributing 
trading characteristics to different investors. [25] confirm these findings and argue 
that such strategies could level the risk and magnitude of mispricing and information 
dispute.  
As results vary across studies, datasets and approaches, we are among the first who 
combine the sufficiency of a long term analysis with a proxy derived from a practical 
and academic background and validated with a proprietary dataset indicating algo-
rithmic and non-algorithmic activity. 
3 Information Technology in Financial Markets 
3.1 Academic Approach 
Various proxies that are used in related studies identify specific IT innovations (like 
the amount of algorithmic or high-frequency traders). Most times these proxies are 
based on the characteristics of the related trading behavior: algorithmic trading as 
well as high-frequency trading are associated with a high amount of order traffic since 
related systems allow for quick submission, modification and cancellation of large 
amounts of orders without human intervention [7]. Therefore, a notable amount of 
proxies have been proposed to measure this specific behavior to quantify algorithmic 
trading. [9] Are the first who use “message traffic” as a proxy. They argue that this 
measure is also used by market participants and market venues, which shall provide 
evidence for its practical applicability. Due to an increasing trading and message vol-
ume, they normalize their proxy by dividing the messages per $100 volume of shares 
traded. [26] Modify this proxy for their study because of the fact that they are only 
able to observe best quotes and trades in contrast to all messages as in [9]. [26] Argue 
that both approaches are very similar and prove this issue by comparing their dataset 
with [9]. While this concept seems quite straightforward, it should be stated that both 
proxies are influenced by the market itself. A significant change in price, most nota-
bly if the time horizon is long enough, might heavily bias such a proxy, particularly in 
times of market turmoils. One might argue that there is an influence of the price level 
on the amount of trading done by algorithms and comparables, but certainly not in 
such a linear way. Further, the authors do not reveal the composite nor the exact defi-
nition of “messages”. 
A different approach is presented by [27] who take into account typical algorithmic 
trading strategies which result in so called “strategic runs”. These strategic runs are 
linked messages which are the result of dynamic order placement strategies typically 
employed by computerized traders. They argue that messages which are observed in 
small time intervals are linked together and are therefore closer related to non-humans 
as to humans, especially as humans are not able to react in such a low latency envi-
ronment. Taking this into account, they conclude that all activity following within the 
next second of the submission or execution could be algorithm activity. The approach 
is further refined as only the activity which matches the trading direction and volume 
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of the submission/execution is classified as relevant. The proxy introduced by [27] 
might miss activity which does not immediately follow on execution/submission. For 
example, electronic market maker systems submit orders which might not get execut-
ed within the following second. In recent months an increasing awareness to these 
issues by the market venues could be observed. Consequently the next subsection will 
show their view and efforts made to identify and limit algorithmic traders. 
3.2 Practical Approach 
While academia focuses on actively determining the amount of technology at a mar-
ket-level, exchanges focus on the message-intensive behavior at a client-level. Their 
key focus is not the actual amount of IT but the massive increase in order messages 
which stresses the market’s infrastructures. Exchanges earn fees when a trade occurs, 
in contrast to the procession of submission, modification or deletion messages which 
are not obliged to fees. In fact, a high amount of messages which do not result in an 
increased amount of executions stresses IT-resources and therefore increases infra-
structure costs. The emergence of new technologies such as high-frequency trading 
further amplified the message-intensive behavior of these traders. As a consequence, 
several exchanges started to charge for the amount of messages every client submits 
related to the resulting trades, measured by the OTR. If the OTR exceeds a certain 
threshold, a fine has to be paid by the market participant for future messages. Howev-
er, there exist different ways to calculate OTR, as shown by Table 1. In this context, 
different thresholds and message-types are defined by the exchanges. 
Table 1. Current OTR thresholds of Exchanges. 
Exchange Traffic-Type OTR-
Threshold 
 Submission Modification Deletion  
Boerse Italiana [28] ✓ ✓ ✓ 40 – 100* 
Deutsche Boerse [11] ✓ ✓ ✓ 500 – 5000* 
EDGX [12] ✓ ✓ ✓ 100 
NASDAQ [29] ✓   300 
* varies according to the instrument. 
 
As depicted in Table 1, exchanges have a different understanding of which traffic-
types should be included to calculate the respective OTR. In particular, all venues 
take into account the submissions while others focus on modifications and deletion as 
well. The same applies to OTR thresholds which vary tremendously around different 
venues. These differences in parameters might be caused by the kind of traders the 
exchanges want to attract. For example, EDGX focuses on long-term investors rather 
than algorithmic traders. Therefore, EDGX rewards an OTR lower than six with re-
bates (e.g. for investment funds) and punishes OTRs higher than 100 with fees [12].  
Additionally, German lawmakers consider OTR in their current proposal of the 
high-frequency trading act (“Hochfrequenzhandelsgesetz”). The law proposed by the 
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federal ministry of finance is out in place to prevent high volatility market situations. 
They propose that every exchange has to introduce a self defined OTR threshold. This 
threshold should be appropriate regarding the key properties of the financial instru-
ment (like liquidity) and the role of the market participant e.g. proprietary traders vs. 
market makers. With this approach, they seek to minimize the risk of a system break-
down involved by reaching the limit of the exchange’s IT-system-capacity [30].  
Using OTR as proxy for IT-based trading activities is quite appealing as it captures 
algorithmic and low-latency trading activity at their key dimensions: massive order 
traffic-generation with a low amount of trades. Furthermore, it should be noted that 
this proxy is independent from the price level. On the other side, OTR is not able to 
capture the entire non-human activity, e.g. algorithms which use market orders or 
momentum traders would not increase the OTR. However, until now, there has been 
no study evaluating how good OTR covers non-human market activity. 
3.3 Order-To-Trade Ratio and Data Setup 
In our study, we use OTR to determine the amount of IT-based trading participation 
during each trading day. As stated in the previous section, OTR covers the key char-
acteristics of the IT-driven change within securities trading – the growing imbalance 
within the order traffic activity and the resulting trade executions (Figure 1). The 
OTR measure is independent from any price level changes possibly influencing vari-
ous proxies. This is especially important when long time periods are analyzed, as the 
variability of prices on the long run may result in a variability of a price dependent 
proxy even though the participation level is unchanged.  
 
Fig. 1. Medians of daily order submissions (dark) and executions (light) over the DAX 30 
constituents from January 2008 until August 2011 
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For our calculation, we take into account that all exchanges agree that submissions 
belong to the OTR (see table 1) and therefore, we conclude that a focus on submis-
sions seems to be most appropriate. Figure 1 illustrates the daily median amount of 
order submissions (dark) and executed trades (light) within the German blue chips. It 
is evident that next to the seasonal declines in trading activity (December), starting in 
2008 the number of submissions has nearly doubled, where the number of executed 
trades remains fairly stable. This is even more interesting as we consider an instru-
ment-aggregated view. In contrast to the exchanges’ client-view, this level of detail 
captures the daily aggregated OTR including all trading participants within each in-
strument and thus allows for an assessment of the instrument specific change over 
time. Moreover, even this level of aggregation confirms the exchange’s fear of a mas-
sively increased IT overload. Our measure is therefore defined as follows: 
OTR=(Submissions per Day)/(Trades per Day) (1) 
Based on the data of the 30 constituents of the German blue chip index DAX, we 
aggregate the number of order submissions for each day and each instrument from 
January 2008 to August 2011 to build a daily panel. We use Thomson Reuters Tick 
History (TRTH) times and sales data as well as order book situations. Since the sub-
missions are not directly observable in TRTH, we estimate the total number of order 
submissions by taking into account the increase of the number of orders at each order 
book level at a tick-by-tick method. OTR is calculated using the daily amount of 
submissions per reported trades for each DAX 30 instrument.  
4 Empirical Study 
4.1 Validation of the Order-to-Trade-Ratio 
In order to validate our assumptions that the increase in OTR is related to the level of 
IT-based activity we investigate whether it is capable of distinguishing human from 
non-human trading activity.  
Therefore, we take into account a unique dataset covering the German blue chip 
index DAX 30 order book activity directly provided by Deutsche Boerse AG. Accord-
ing to [31], Deutsche Boerse AG accounts for about 75% of the DAX turnover within 
the European lit markets and therefore represents the primary venue for German blue 
chips. The dataset captures executions, order submissions, modifications and dele-
tions of all German blue chips within a ten day period in March 2009. Next to stand-
ard order characteristics, the dataset contains an indication for automated trading ac-
tivity. This automated trading flag indicates if certain order events were triggered by 
non-human market participants. The identification is made possible because of a pric-
ing program introduced by Deutsche Boerse AG in 2009, which was offered to insti-
tutional investors using algorithmic trading or co-location services. Participants of this 
trading program had to identify whenever a transaction was generated by an algorithm 
and in return received a rebate on each submission. Due to this economic incentive we 
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believe that the identification of algorithmic traders via the automated trading pro-
gram is the best currently available proxy, further it has been applied and evaluated 
before by [22].  
We calculate a specific daily human and non-human trading OTR based on the 
unique dataset to show the difference in trading characteristics. Table 2 shows de-
scriptive statistics for both fractions indicating that on average, non-human traders 
submit ten orders to achieve one execution where, on average, human traders submit 
only half of the orders to achieve the same amount of executions. Both ratios are sta-
ble for the observation period and the null hypothesis, that both ratios decent from the 
same population can be rejected at high significance levels, as shown by Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test (Table 2). Interestingly, the correlation between both could only be 
considered as medium, indicating that human and non-human traders alter their sub-
mission to execution behavior non-symmetrically, i.e. react on market signals slightly 
different. 
Table 2. Descriptive comparison of the OTR. 
Non-Human Human 
Mean 10.404 5.489 
Median 10.294 5.611 
Coefficient of variation 0.0783 0.101 
Correlation 0.585 
H0: Human OTR = Non-Human OTR z = 3,780*** 
 
This observation is in line with findings provided by [7], [9] who found machine mes-
sage activity to heavily outweigh human activity. However, one may argue that the 
daily change within the OTR could also be influenced by a systematic change in the 
underlying ratios. Over the time, human submission activity may have increased tre-
mendously, resulting in an overall increase in OTR without an increased participation 
of computer traders. Therefore, our further empirical analysis will encompass a lim-
ited time window around this data sample. In particular, our time horizon will capture 
the years 2008, 2009, 2010 and parts of 2011. We assume that within this period a 
possible change in the basic human / non-human activity level is limited. Foremost, as 
the human capability to increase its submission activity is limited due to perception 
constraints, a possible change is more likely originated by non-humans. Within the 
next section, we present our empirical model and the related results 
4.2 Market Quality 
While most of the authors focus on a possible increase in excess returns, cost savings 
or industrial output at company level to assess IT productivity, we focus on possible 
network effects, i.e. external market effects, due to the increased usage of automated 
trading participation, measured in OTR. Therefore, we claim that the overall in-
creased OTR alters market quality. Market quality is mostly quantified by the two 
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key-metrics liquidity and price volatility. Liquidity represents the ability to efficiently 
meet supply and demand and affects transaction costs for all market participants. Fur-
ther it is a decisive factor in the competition for order flow among and between ex-
changes as well as proprietary trading venues [23]. Likewise volatility, a measure for 
the variability of asset prices, is indicating the level of uncertainty about the true value 
of the respective asset. High volatility would bias an investor’s valuation and poten-
tially resulting in incorrect investment decisions [23]. 
We address both metrics in order to evaluate possible effects of OTR on securities 
markets. In order to evaluate different aspects of liquidity and volatility, we use two 
different measures for each metric. Volatility is measured by the standard deviation of 
the order book’s midpoint, so we account for the average prices’ waviness and stabil-
ity around its mean. To account for the prices’ maximum deviation, i.e. the amount of 
mispricing and overreaction, we use a daily high to low ratio. Following [23], a mar-
ket’s liquidity can be separated in various dimensions. We focus on the daily relative 
spread as indication for the average implicit trading costs investors face. As market 
participants demand a compensation for staying in the market, a reduced relative 
spread may indicate a reduced risk compensation for the traders. Further, we rely on 
the order book’s average depth, i.e. Depth(X). Depth(X) measures the order book 
thickness X basis points around the midpoint. Traditionally, Depth(X) is denoted in 
Euro order volume. Since the Depth(X) and the relative spread are highly correlated, 
as the relative spread determines the amount of orders next to the midpoint particular-
ly if few basis points are chosen, we calculate Depth(X) by excluding the spread and 
measuring order book depth X basis point around the best bid / best ask. As argued 
before, we abandon the demotion in Euro volume for the amount of limit orders. 
Because of the cross-sectional time series character of our sample we deploy panel 
regression techniques. This method allows a comprehensive time-sensitive analysis 
over multiple entities (instruments) and therefore enhances the significance and ro-
bustness of our analysis in comparison to ordinary time series analysis. According to 
[33], the choice between a First Differencing (FD) and Fixed Effects (FE) panel mod-
el hinges on the assumptions about the idiosyncratic error term. In particular, the FE 
estimator is more efficient under the assumption of a serially uncorrelated error term, 
while the FD estimator is more efficient when the error term follows a random walk. 
Considering the large time series component of our data structure, we perform a panel 
regression based on the FE estimator while using the FD estimator for subsequent 
robustness checks. If FE and FD estimates differ in ways that cannot be attributed to 
sampling error, violations of the exogeneity assumption can be assumed [33]. Instead, 
results are considered robust, if FE and FD estimators show consistent results. The 
error structure is tested to be heteroskedastic, autocorrelated, and correlated between 
the groups. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are robust to very general forms of cross-
sectional ("spatial") and temporal dependence when the time dimension becomes 
large. This nonparametric technique of estimating standard errors does not place any 
restrictions on the limiting behavior of the number of panels [34]. The estimated 
equation takes the following form: 
 
Yit = β‘Xit + αi + uit 
 
(2) 
437 
 
 
 
The dependent scalar Y captures one of our liquidity or volatility measures, αi captures 
the entity-specific intercepts and uit the error term. In line with previous studies like 
[9] and [26], we include fixed effects for each stock (FD) as well as time and weekday 
dummies, further we include a couple of control variables as well as the OTR (1 × K 
vector X and β ≡ (β1, β2,…, βK) is a K × 1 vector). We control for instrument-specific 
effects via market value, price level, absolute daily return, a couple of dummy varia-
bles to capture corporate actions, i.e. equity splits and mergers. To capture the overall 
growth within the securities trading industry we further add a trend component as well 
as overall volume aggregates and averages. We include the daily submissions (Sub-
missions) and number of trades (Trades) in order to eliminate their individual effect 
and highlight possible effects of OTR. In addition the model is presented without 
Trades and Submissions as these variables are implicit part of OTR by definition. 
Combining OTR and these two variables in one regression might bias the results by 
generating some artificial correlation amongst the explanation variables. Table 3 illus-
trates the results of the regression on volatility. 
Table 3. Effect of Information Technology on Volatility 
Regression on Volatility (FE) 
 Standard Deviation Midpoint High / Low 
 β T-Value β T-Value β T-Value β T-Value 
OTR -0.008 -8.47*** -0.006 -4.08*** -0.001 -5.52*** -0.001 -3.21*** 
Trades -  0.001 6.25*** -  0.000 9.51*** 
Submissions -  0.000 0.87       -  0.000 3.14 *** 
Controls Included Included Included Included 
Trend & 
Time effects Included Included Included Included 
Stock effects Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded 
Observations 25,500 25,500 25,500 25,500 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Max VIF 4.28 9.42 4.28 9.42 
* / ** / *** significant at 90 / 95 / 99 percent level. For correlation among independent varia-
bles, we calculated maximum Variance Inflation Index (VIF) of each model. 
 
The results indicate a persistent relationship between price volatility and the altering 
OTR. Therefore, volatility, i.e. the standard deviation, as well as the total amount of 
price over- and undershooting, i.e. the high-to-low ratio, is significantly decreased in 
times of above average OTR. The results are consistent using the FD estimator (re-
sults are not reported here due to space constraints). Keeping in mind that we control 
for the individual effects of number of trades and number of submissions, the ratio 
indicates that even an asynchronous divergence of both values, i.e. an increase of the 
OTR, is accompanied by a lower level of volatility next to the independent effects. 
The coefficient at number of trades has a positive sign, since the positive relationship 
between trading activity and volatility was already proven empirically by e.g. [35], 
[36]. 
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We reuse the proposed model to verify our liquidity proxies, i.e. the relative spread 
and the depth measures. Again, we include control variables as well as time and trend 
dummies. Table 4 comprises the results. 
Table 4. Effect of Information Technology on Liquidity 
Regression on Liquidity (FE) 
 Relative Spread Depth (3) ex. spread 
 β T-Value β T-Value β T-Value β T-Value 
OTR 0.000 5.09*** 0.000  5.66*** -47.83 -3.26*** 9.097  0.67 
Trades -  0.000  1.76* -  0.531  5.70*** 
Submissions -  0.000 -1.58 -  -0.007 -1.18** 
Controls Included Included Included Included 
Trend & 
Time effects Included Included Included Included 
Stock effects Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded 
Observations 25,500 25,500 25,500 25,500 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Max VIF 4.28 9.42 4.28 9.42 
* / ** / *** significant at 90 / 95 / 99 percent level. For correlation among independent varia-
bles, we calculated maximum Variance Inflation Index (VIF) of each model. 
 
Although significant in both models, the results show diverging effects on liquidity. 
Starting with the relative spread, an increase in the daily OTR is accompanied by a 
widening of the corresponding relative spreads. Wider relative spreads are equivalent 
to larger compensation for market participants staying in the market and thus, we do 
not observe a reduction of this risk premium in times of higher OTR. Foremost, the 
spread is widening, although the average effect is small. The FD estimator backs this 
result (results are not reported here due to space constraints). On the other side, the 
depth measure does not a show persistent relation. As the FD estimator also shows 
diverting effects, we cannot conclude any relationship between OTR and the order 
book depth.  
4.3 Discussion  
We provide empirical insights that the ongoing increase in OTR contributes to chang-
es within market dynamics. The longitudinal analysis indicates that next to the overall 
growth in trading volumes and prices, the increased usage of algorithms and high 
speed market access, resulting in increased daily OTR, is related to a decrease in daily 
market volatility. We observe lower maximum daily price movements as well as low-
er trade-per-trade price variability at days with high OTR, leading to investor’s deci-
sional benefit. Furthermore, we are able to confirm findings of former proprietary 
data setups indicating that the participation of algorithmic traders is associated with 
more stable prices for short periods of time, e.g. [22], [23]. Modern IT trading sys-
tems and algorithms allow market monitoring and cross-market price observation and 
offer opportunities to realize small profits. Therefore, the risk of mispricing, repre-
sented by an increase of the high-to-low ratio, is heavily reduced as automated sys-
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tems eliminate price divergences close to real-time. Further, with the algorithms’ 
ability to submit and keep trades close to the top of the order book, prices become 
more stable.  
Focusing on the regression model for our liquidity measures, results diverge heavi-
ly within our models. First, we focus at the order book’s relative spread, i.e. the rela-
tive difference between best bid and best ask. In fact, our findings suggest that an 
increase in the OTR is accompanied by wider spreads, although we control for specif-
ic order book pattern. Therefore, price stability comes at a price; market participants 
demand higher compensation for the price monitoring services. Concerning order 
book depth, we do not observe a persistent relation. The divergence in both models, 
FD and FE, as well as the divergence through additional control variables indicate 
endogenity problems possible due to omitted variables. Therefore, a mere 
technologisation of the trading environment does not boost order book volumes. Fur-
ther, as our approach does not analyze any causal relationship between the dependent 
and independent variables, and despite of the various robustness checks, our results 
have to be further verified carefully before drawing regulatory conclusions. As a con-
sequence, we speak of indications on co-movements rather than causal dependency.  
5 Conclusion  
The question whether IT has a positive impact on firms or market sectors is challeng-
ing academia for several years as it is very hard to measure both: the emergence of IT 
and the impact it generates. This question is of high relevance specifically in the case 
of the financial industry where substantial IT investments are made.  
Within this study, we analyze the impact of IT-based trading activities on financial 
markets. Based on academic and practical measures, we identify OTR as an appropri-
ate proxy to capture the key characteristics of the IT driven change within securities 
trading. We evaluate this measure by means of a proprietary dataset indicating non-
human trading activity.  
Our contributions are threefold: At first, we provide the first study applying and 
evaluating OTR in order to measure the amount of IT-based trading. This measure 
can be used in future research to quantify the amount of these strategies on the basis 
of public available data. Second, we are among the first who empirically validate 
OTR with a proprietary dataset which is labeled according to non-human trading ac-
tivity. Thus, we combine the advantage of applying a reliable measure within a longi-
tudinal analysis. Finally, we consequently provide an indication that IT may have a 
positive impact on a whole sector. In our case, we find that the share of IT supported 
trading at a financial market improves price stability but in turn leads to the demand 
for higher risk compensations. 
However, we are aware of the limitation that OTR does not necessarily capture all 
dimensions of IT-based trading activities. Most obvious, activities leading to order 
modifications and deletions are not covered by our approach. Further, as the German 
market system never suffered from a major outage caused by fraud algorithms or low-
latency cascades, we would very much highlight that these findings inherit practical 
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ideality. Therefore, additional markets need to be analyzed to gain further insides. At 
last, besides of numerous robustness checks, we so far do not evaluate a distinct caus-
al relationship. Therefore, further research is necessary before regulatory conclusions 
can be drawn. 
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